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Abstract
Extending the Kim (1989) model of endogenous labor specializa-
tion to an overlapping generations model with an endogenous technol-
ogy choice, we show in this paper that, when the market size and the
ﬁxed costs associated with the technologies with labor specialization
are small, the growth pattern of this economy depends on worker ex-
pectations. In other words, if workers expect low returns of speciﬁc
human capital, they will not invest in such capital, and the economy
will be eventually locked in an underdevelopment trap. On the other
hand, if they expect high returns of speciﬁc human capital, they in-
vest in such capital, and, as a result, the economy can exhibit long-run
growth.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
In this paper, we analyze the relationship between labor specialization and
patterns of growth. This issue has been studied by several researchers, in-
cluding Yang and Borland (1991) and Becker and Murphy (1992).1 Yang
and Borland (1991) developed a dynamic model of specialization. In their
model, as the degree of division of labor increases, each individual becomes
more specialized, and therethrough his learning speed rises. As a result, the
whole economy can exhibit accelerated growth. Becker and Murphy (1992)
developed a multisector model with increasing returns to labor specializa-
tion and coordination costs and showed that the degree of specialization of
an economy is determined by the market size and coordination costs.2
Moreover, Kim (1989) developed an insightful model of labor special-
ization.3 In the model, workers can invest in two kinds of human capital.
One, general human capital, can be used to reduce the matching cost with
a potential employer by expanding the range of the workers’ skills, and the
other, speciﬁc human capital, gives higher productivity on a limited range of
speciﬁc skill. For a given distribution of each worker’s general and speciﬁc
human capital, a ﬁrm determines its organizational structure so as to equate
the matching cost and the gain from productivity improvements in narrowing
its activity range. Using this model, Kim shows that an increase in the size
of the labor market raises speciﬁc human capital. Moreover, Kim and Mon-
tadi (1992) extend the Kim model to a Ramsey-type growth model and show
that the endogenous evolution of labor specialization can yield endogenous
growth.
In this paper we extend the Kim model to an overlapping generations
model. We consider two kinds of production technologies: those with and
without increasing returns due to labor specialization. The former is an
advanced type, which is similar to that considered by Kim, and the latter is a
primitive type. In this setting, we show that, when the market is signiﬁcantly
large, advanced technologies can be adopted. We also show that workers’
1See Cheng and Yang (2004) and Yang and Ng (1998) for detailed surveys of the
literature.
2See also Rosen (1983) and Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1991).
3See also Weitzman (1994) for a similar model.
2choice of advanced technologies has strategic complementaries, and, hence,
the pattern of growth of the economy may depend on worker expectations.
In other words, the economy can exhibit endogenous growth in the case of
optimistic expectations but may be captured by a development trap under
pessimistic expectations.
The basic mechanism behind these results is as follows. In the case of
a large market, the demand for the ﬁnal good when the advanced tech-
nologies are adopted is large and thus the relative return of the advanced
technology production is suﬃciently high because of increasing returns. If
workers have optimistic expectations, all workers will choose to work at ﬁrms
with advanced technologies, and the economy could exhibit perpetual growth
through an increasing degree of labor specialization. In contrast, when the
market size is small, because of the high cost of the advanced technologies,
no ﬁrms will adopt advanced technologies, which would result in a poverty
trap.
These results are closely related to those of Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny
(1989), Redding (1996), and Davis (2003, 2005).4 In the model of Murphy,
Shleifer, and Vishny, when the market is not large, no ﬁrm could gener-
ate suﬃcient demand to make adoption of an increasing returns technology
proﬁtable, even though simultaneous adoption by all ﬁrms of the increasing
returns technology makes the adoption proﬁtable. Redding (1996) constructs
a model with R&D and human capital accumulation and shows that human
capital investment and R&D investment are strategic complements, and,
thus, multiple equilibria would be possible. In other words, an economy may
be captured by a low-skills trap or achieve high-growth equilibrium, depend-
ing on expectations. Moreover, Davis constructs several specialization-driven
growth models with an underdevelopment trap. In Davis (2003), a trap may
occur because of low-quality public institutions or infrastructure, and, in
Davis (2005), it could arise because of the low ability of the economy to
develop new institutions.5
4Rodrik (1996) and Rodriguez-Clare (1996) also derive similar results. However, be-
cause their models are static, they cannot analyze the relationship between growth patterns
and agents’ expectations. See Azariadis and Stachurski (2005) for a excellent survey on
the issue of underdevelopment traps.
5Developing a growth model in which the evolution of the division of labor not only
drives long-run growth but also undermines the informal institutions, Davis (2006) shows
3This paper is organized as follows. The next section contains a description
of an overlapping generations model with labor specialization. The steady-
state equilibria of the model are characterized in Section 3, and Section 4 is
the conclusion.
2T h e M o d e l
2.1 Households
Each generation lives for two periods. The population of each generation
is constant and denoted by N. A generation working in period t is called
generation t. In the working period, each generation derives utility from
the consumption of goods and educational expenditure for their children. In
period t − 1, generation t is born and educated. In that period, generation
t divides the educational expenditure given by the parents into general and
speciﬁc education so as to maximize its wage in the next period. A more
d e t a i l e de x p l a n a t i o no ft h i sp r o c e s si sg i v e nb e l o w .
In period t, the generation t works, receives wages, and allocates the wages
between consumption ct and educational expenditure et for the children:
wt = ct + et.
The utility function of generation t is given by
Ut =( 1− α)lnct + αlnet, 0 < α < 1.
This setting yields the following optimal consumption and education expen-
diture for the child:
ct =( 1− α)wt, and et = αwt. (1)
2.2 Production
There is one ﬁnal good, which is produced by the use of labor. The price
of the ﬁnal good is normalized as 1. At each time, there is a continuum of
that over-specialization occurs when individuals regard the quality of informal institutions
as being independent of their specialization decisions.
4workers, and the total population of the workers is N. Each worker has its
own characteristics concerning its suitability in speciﬁc production, and the
workers are uniformly distributed on a unit circle. A worker located at point
u o nt h ec i r c l ei si n d e x e da su, and the index represents its production ability
at the point. If the worker works at a ﬁrm located somewhere other than
point u, some matching costs are required.
Given the educational expenditure determined by the parent, each child
accumulates two kinds of human capital, extensive (denoted by g)a n di n -
tensive (denoted by b), and, when old, the worker supplies one unit of labor
and receives a wage. Extensive human capital presents the generality of a
worker’s skill, whereas intensive human capital stands for the depth of his
skill; in other words, the accumulation of extensive human capital reduces
the matching costs with potential producers, while that of intensive human
capital improves the workers’ productivity.
In this economy, there are many production technologies, and they are
classiﬁed into two types.6 One is a ”primitive technology,” which is a variant
of the standard constant-returns-to-scale neoclassical production technology.
The other is an advanced type, which consists of a continuum of similar pro-
duction technologies. Our speciﬁcation of the advanced technologies basically
follows Kim (1989). Each advanced technology has a diﬀerent characteristic,
and the characteristic is represented by its location on the same unit cir-
c l ea sw o r k e r s .T h i st y p eo ft e c h n o l o g ye x h i b i t si n c r e a s i n gr e t u r n st ol a b o r
specialization.
Each ﬁrm chooses one of the two types of technology.7 The measure of
workers employed by the ﬁrms with advanced technologies is denoted by n.
Because workers are assumed to be uniformly distributed on a unit circle, n
also represents the density of the distribution.
When young, each child determines g and b under rational expectations
about the behavior of other children in the current period and the technology
choice in the next period. When old, he chooses a ﬁrm to work for. Once a
worker chooses a ﬁrm with one type of technology, the worker cannot work
at ﬁrms with the other type of technology.
6Iwaisako (2002) employs a similar setting.
7Once a ﬁrm selects one technology, the ﬁrm cannot switch it to the other type.
52.3 Primitive Technology
Each worker can increase his productivity at a ﬁrm with the primitive tech-
nology by accumulating general human capital; in other words, when worker
j’s extensive human capital is gj, the worker can produce a(gj)u n i to ft h e
ﬁnal good at a ﬁrm with the primitive technology, where
a(gj)=δg
η
j, δ > 0a n dη > 0. (2)
The aggregate production function of the ﬁrms with the primitive tech-






where SP is the set of workers employed by the primitive ﬁrms. Aggregate
employment by these ﬁrms (a measure of SP)i sd e n o t e db yx.8




where A(g) ≡ δgη. Because of free entry the equilibrium proﬁtm u s tb ez e r o ,






which gives the wage oﬀered by the primitive ﬁrms. The restriction η < 1/2
implies that general skill accumulation generates a moderate improvement
of productivity. As is shown below, the condition is necessary for our model
to have a stable equilibrium.
2.4 Advanced Technologies
The advanced technologies exhibit increasing returns to labor specialization
and have their own characteristic indices, which are distributed on the same
circle on which workers’ characteristics are distributed. Thus, each ﬁrm





6is indexed by skill index i, which denotes a point on the unit circle. If a
worker’s skill characteristics precisely match the ﬁrm’s characteristics, the
worker could start to work at the ﬁrm without any cost. However, if it
diﬀers from the ﬁrm’s characteristics, costly training of the worker, ”job re-
quirement,” would be necessary, and the cost would be paid by the ﬁrm.
Since it is assumed that worker u’s productivity at ﬁrm i depends on the dis-
tance between the worker and the ﬁrm, s ≡ |i−u|, the worker’s productivity
at the ﬁrm could be denoted as a function of s, which is represented by x(s).
Firm i’s production is increased by the worker’s speciﬁc human capital b and
decreased by the distance between the ﬁrm and the worker. Speciﬁcally, the





The advanced technologies require an identical minimum scale M, and due
to the Romer (1986) - Lucas (1988) type externalities, the productivity of a
ﬁrm with the advanced type depends on the average level of general human
capital of workers at the ﬁrm. Formally, we specify the productivity function




Ai(xi − M) xi ≥ M, (5)








In (6), yi, Si, Ai, and F(s)r e p r e s e n tﬁrm i’s output, the set of workers
employed by the ﬁrm, the Arrow-Romer type external eﬀect, and the distri-
bution function of a(gs), respectively. Thus, xi and Ai, respectively, represent
the total labor input and the productivity of ﬁrm i.
Following Kim (1989), let us restrict our analysis to symmetric equilib-
rium.9 Then, since every worker chooses the same values of g and b,w eh a v e




A(g)(xi − M) xi ≥ M.
9In the Kim model, there exist asymmetric equilibria along with the symmetric equi-
libria. See Kim (1990) for this point.
7Under the assumption of a zero-proﬁt symmetric bargaining equilibrium, the












where n is the number of workers employed in these ﬁrms. Appendix A
provides a formal proof of (7). Each worker correctly anticipates this wage
function before investing in the human capital.
2.5 Technology Choice
In this subsection we analyze the process of technology choice. Children
select their composition of skill to maximize their income (wage in the old
period). For this purpose, they rationally expect wages oﬀered in both the
primitive and advanced ﬁrms. As is shown below, the wage rates depend on
the technology choice, and, thus, their decision on skill composition depends
on the expectation on technology choice.
The labor market equilibrium condition is
N = n + x,
where N is the total population of workers. The equilibrium wage w∗ satisﬁes
w
∗ =m a x( wp,w A)
because workers can freely choose the ﬁrm to work for. This relationship can
be rewritten as follows:








Since a slight perturbation changes an interior solution into a corner solution,
(N,0) or (0,N), we focus our analysis on the corner solutions.
2.5.1 Human Capital Investment
When investing in two kinds of human capital, each worker rationally antici-
pates the wage rate at each type of ﬁrm. After the human capital investment,
the worker is employed by a ﬁrm oﬀering the highest wage.
8The human capital investment process is analyzed here. The cost function
of human capital accumulation is
e = G(b,g)=( 1+b)
βg
γ, β > 1, γ > 1, (9)
where e is the expenditure for human capital investment and this value is
exogenous to the worker because it is determined by the worker’s parents. β
and γ respectively denote the cost parameters of specialized and generalized
skill acquisition. The multiplicative formulation of the cost function makes it
p o s s i b l et oo b t a i na na n a l y t i c a ls o l u t i o n and the restrictions on the parameter
values (β > 1a n dγ > 1) imply that the return from educational expenditure
in human capital investment exhibits decreasing returns to scale.
A worker’s equilibrium allocation of the expenditure between b and g
depends on the worker’s expectation of other workers’ behavior. When the
worker expects (n,x)=( 0 ,N), setting b = 0 and maximizing only with
respect to g is optimal since b is not utilized in the production with the
primitive technology. Therefore, (4) and (9) yield the following equilibrium




When the worker expects (n,x)=( N,0), the wage rate in ﬁrms with ad-



















as is derived in Appendix B. Here, we assume β > 2γ in order to assure
that wA will be positive, which means that the cost of speciﬁc human capital
acquisition is relatively higher than that of general human capital acquisition.
If this inequality does not hold, no ﬁrms adopt the advanced technologies.
As is shown below, a major determinant of technological choice in our
model is the expectation of workers on the two wage rates. In analyzing this
point, it is useful to introduce technological-level-adjusted wage rates
ˆ wA ≡ wA/A(g)a n dˆ wp ≡ wp/A(g)=1 . (12)
Comparing these two rates, we can analyze the type of technology that will
be adopted in equilibrium.
92.5.2 Equilibrium Choice of Technology
Given the common factor A(g), it follows from (11) and (12) that a reduction
in n decreases ˆ wA and, from (4) and (12), that ˆ wp is independent of n.
Thus, we can depict the technological-level-adjusted wage rates as functions
of n (see Figure 1). In order to see the property of the ˆ wA schedule let
us diﬀerentiate ˆ wA with respect to β and γ (the ˆ wp schedule is trivially
independent of β and γ). Then, we have
∂ ln ˆ wA
∂β
< 0, and
∂ ln ˆ wA
∂γ
> 0
under the condition that the population size n is large, the ﬁxed cost M is low
and educational expenditure e is large. In this case, a reduction in the cost of
speciﬁc skill accumulation or a rise in the cost of general skill accumulation
shifts the ˆ wA schedule upward but has no eﬀect on the ˆ wp schedule.
Using Figure 1, we next examine how the equilibrium technology choice
is determined. Equations (11) and (12) show the following inequality for
suﬃciently small values of n:

















,( 1 3 )
as is depicted in Figure 1. Thus, if workers expect that no workers will be
employed by ﬁrms with advanced technologies, then all workers will always
choose ﬁrms with the primitive technology. In contrast, if
ˆ wA(n;e) > 1( 1 4 )
holds, ﬁrms with advanced technologies are chosen by workers.10 Using (4)


















This inequality may hold if n is suﬃciently large (see Figure 1).
10If wA = wp, each worker is indiﬀerent to both types of ﬁrms.
10Furthermore, because ˆ wA(n;e) is a monotonic function of e,w ec a ne x -















each worker selects to work at an advanced ﬁrm. On the other hand, if
e<¯ e(n), (16)
each worker chooses to work at a ﬁrm with primitive technology. This im-
plies that, if educational expenditure is suﬃciently high and/or the ﬁxed
cost is suﬃciently low, all workers can be employed by ﬁrms with advanced
technologies. However, it should be noted here that whether or not this tech-
nology selection is realized depends on worker expectations. As (15) shows,
for a given value of n, if the level of educational expenditure is suﬃciently
large, i.e., if e>¯ e(n), all ﬁrms decide to adopt the advanced type and, as a
result, n increases. In this case, because all ﬁrms adopt the advanced tech-
nologies, we have n = N in equilibrium. In contrast, if workers expect n =0 ,
e becomes smaller than lim
n→0
¯ e(n) because lim
n→0
¯ e(n)=∞. Thus, all workers
choose to work at primitive ﬁrms; in other words, n = 0 always constitutes
an equilibrium.
These arguments are summarized in Figure 1. As is depicted in Figure 1,
when the curve which represents ˆ wA(n;e)i n t e r s e c t sw i t ht h eˆ wp line, there
are multiple equilibria, while, when the curve is located below the ˆ wp line,
there is only an equilibrium without labor specialization.
3 Steady States
3.1 Long-run Growth with Labor Specialization
When n = N, the equilibrium wage rate is determined by wAt = wA(N,et−1),
as shown by (11). Combining (1), (4), (11), n = N, and the equilibrium level


















As is apparent from (17), the property of equilibrium dynamics depends on
the values of several parameters. It is easy to show that, when
1−2η
β−2γ > 1,
that is, when 1 > 2η + β − 2γ, wt diverges as time goes to inﬁnity, whereas



















Because our main concern lies in analyzing the relationship between labor
specialization and the long-run growth rate, we impose the following restric-
tion:
Balanced Growth Restriction
2η + β − 2γ =1 .













β +2 η − 1
¶β 1 − 2η
β +2 η − 1
− 1. (18)
Intuitively speaking, under (18), the sum of positive eﬀects from increasing
returns to specialization and positive external eﬀects in general human capi-
tal accumulation oﬀset increasing costs in human capital accumulation, and
therefore the economy can exhibit perpetual balanced growth.11
As (18) indicates, the balanced growth rate depends on several parameters
in the model. In order to see the dependence of the growth rate on the










11A similar condition is derived by Davis (2004).
12These results show that educational expenditure, which is determined by
α, and the scale of the market, which may be captured by the size of the
population in this study, are positively related to the long-run growth rate,
and the ﬁxed cost is negatively related to the growth rate.12
3.2 No-growth Equilibrium without Labor Specializa-
tion
In the case of (n,x)=( 0 ,N), all ﬁrms adopt the primitive technology and




which is derived from (1), (4), and (10). Because η < 1 < γ,t h i sd i ﬀerence
equation is stable, and the economy always converges to the following steady
state:





In other words, this equilibrium exhibits no long-run growth. Because this
equilibrium always exists even if there is another equilibrium with labor
specialization, our economy has the potential for underdevelopment traps.
3.3 Multiple Equilibria and Underdevelopment Traps
Let us derive a condition under which our economy has multiple equilib-
ria. As is apparent from our analysis above, when wA(N) >w p, there are
multiple equilibria. From (1) and (19), we obtain the following steady-state
educational expenditure in a no-growth equilibrium:
¯ ep =( δα)
γ
γ−η. (20)













12It is noteworthy that, as Davis (2004) shows, in many models with division of labor,
transaction costs endogenously determine the market size, and the size is independent
of the population. In this sense, it may be more adequate to regard M as a crucial
determinant of the market size. However, even in this interpretation, a reduction in M
would lead to a larger market and raise the long-run growth rate, and hence the market
size is positively related to the growth rate in a balanced growth equilibrium.
13holds, then there is an endogenous growth equilibrium along with the no-
growth equilibrium. It is obvious that there are parameter sets that satisfy
the above inequality. For example, a low ﬁxed cost and a large size of popula-
tion yield the possibility of multiple equilibria. In this case, if we can change
worker expectations, the economy can escape from the underdevelopment
trap.
In summary, the degree of labor specialization in our economy critically
depends on the market size and expectations of agents. If the size of the
market is suﬃciently large, the demand for the ﬁnal good when the advanced
technologies are adopted is large enough to reduce the relative production
cost under the advanced technologies. As a result, if agents have optimistic
expectations, the economy adopts the advanced technologies and can exhibit
perpetual growth through an increasing degree of labor specialization. In
contrast, if the market is small and/or the production cost by the advanced
technologies is high, the advanced technologies are not employed by any ﬁrms;
in other words, the economy adopts only the primitive technology, and, thus,
the economy exhibits only exogenous growth. An economy in which (21)
does not hold inevitably falls into a no-growth equilibrium. In this case,
some policies that aﬀect α, M, N, and δ are necessary to escape from the
trap.
4C o n c l u s i o n
This study extended the Kim (1989) model of endogenous labor specialization
to an overlapping generations model with an endogenous technology choice
and obtained the following results. The adoption of the increasing returns
technology with labor specialization is possible if the size of the market is
suﬃciently large and/or the ﬁxed cost is suﬃciently small, while the adop-
tion of the primitive technology, which is the constant returns technology, is
always possible. Therefore, there can be multiple equilibria in this economy,
and its pattern of growth may depend on worker expectations.
14Appendix
A. Wage Oﬀered by Advanced Firms
This appendix derives the equilibrium wage oﬀered by advanced ﬁrms. An
advanced ﬁrm hires workers if the marginal value product of the worker at
the ﬁrm exceeds the ﬁrm’s training cost, and a worker selects a ﬁrm oﬀering
the highest net wage if the net wage is not smaller than the his reservation

















where H is the maximum acceptable skill diﬀerence of the ﬁrm. Following
Kim (1989), we limit our analysis to the zero-proﬁt symmetric bargaining
equilibrium; in other words, we assume that (i) all workers choose the same
skill combination (b,g), (ii) the advanced production functions are symmetric
for all ﬁrms and the wages oﬀered by these ﬁrms are identical, and (iii)
ﬁrms are equally spaced on the circle. Under these assumptions, an ith ﬁrm
with an advanced technology employs workers distributed on the interval
(i − H,i+ H), and, therefore, the extent of workers employed by the ﬁrm is
2H and the number of ﬁrms in the market, n, is equal to 1/(2H).
The equilibrium wage is determined by Nash bargaining between the





















where ˜ w is the worker’s reservation wage. We assume that the reservation
wage is the highest possible wage in the negotiation with other ﬁrms on the
unit circle because we assume that, once a worker selects a ﬁrm with advanced
technology, the worker cannot work at ﬁrms with primitive technology, al-
though the worker can work at other ﬁrms with advanced technologies. Be-
cause the distance between two ﬁr m si s2 H and symmetric equilibrium gives



























where A(g)=δgη from (6). It should be noted that this wage function is
independent of s and, thus, a symmetric equilibrium is possible.








Substituting (A3) into (A2), we obtain (7) in the main text.
B. Selection of Technology
The wage rate is determined by condition (8), and the cost function is speci-
ﬁed as (9). In this setting, the optimal allocation of human capitals is derived
as follows. When a worker expects n = 0, the worker maximizes its general
skill, and, thus
(¯ g,¯ b)=( e
1
γ,0). (B1)


























































13It can be easily shown that the second order condition is satisﬁed under our setting.












This equation implies that the marginal rate of substitution of skills is equal
to the marginal rate of transformation of skills. This relationship between bt













2 − 1. (B5)














Combining (B6) and (B5), we obtain the level of intensive human capital in













β−2γ − 1. (B7)




















It should be noted here that wA in (B8) is always non-negative under the
assumption of β > 2γ. As is shown in the main text, in an endogenous growth
equilibrium, the wage rate continues to grow, and e is proportional to the
wage rate (see [1]). Hence, in a balanced-growth equilibrium, wA is positive
if the initial value of wA is positive. This case can be easily supported by
choosing adequate parameter values, and, thus, we assume this case in this
paper.
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Figure 1: Selection of Technology
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